The Guarantee Clause in the States: Structural Protections for Minority Rights and Necessary Limits on the Initiative Power by Stein, Anya J.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 37
Number 2 Winter 2010 Article 4
1-1-2010
The Guarantee Clause in the States: Structural
Protections for Minority Rights and Necessary
Limits on the Initiative Power
Anya J. Stein
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anya J. Stein, The Guarantee Clause in the States: Structural Protections for Minority Rights and Necessary Limits on the Initiative Power, 37
Hastings Const. L.Q. 343 (2010).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol37/iss2/4
The Guarantee Clause in the States:
Structural Protections for Minority Rights and
Necessary Limits on the Initiative Power
by ANYA J. STEIN*
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union,
a Republican Form of Government...
-United States Constitution Article IV, Section 4
The republican principle demands, that the deliberate sense of
the community should govern the conduct of those to whom
they entrust their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified
complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every
transient impulse which the people may receive.
-Alexander Hamilton1
Introduction
The Guarantee Clause 2 protects the republican form of
government and provides essential structural protections for
individual rights. It promises to protect not only the political
structures of representative government, but also the individual rights
of citizens-especially politically unpopular minorities. By
participating in those representative structures, citizens are afforded
constitutional protection from state initiatives that place their rights
on the ballot for a majority plebiscite.
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.,
2006, Political Theory, University of California, San Diego. I am grateful to Professor
Darien Shanske for sparking my interest in this under-valued Clause and for his feedback
on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank the editorial staff of the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly Volume 37.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 349 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003).
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the
Guarantee Clause is nonjusticiable in the federal courts under the
political question doctrine This position has generated substantial
criticism from legal scholars who contend that the Guarantee Clause
was designed to protect individual rights.! Even if the Court
continues to dismiss cases brought under the Guarantee Clause,
however, state courts are also constitutionally obligated to adjudicate
these challenges State courts have two affirmative textual grounds
for this obligation. First, the Supremacy Clause6 requires state judges
to adjudicate federal constitutional challenges to provisions of their
own laws and state constitutions. Second, the United States Supreme
Court has interpreted the Guarantee Clause itself to obligate the
States to provide their citizens with a republican form of government.7
State ballot initiatives are vulnerable to uses that violate the
Guarantee Clause's promise to protect the republican form of
government. Recently, California's divisive Proposition 8 presented
the State's courts with a ballot initiative that placed minority rights on
the ballot for a majority vote, and which purported to alter the
individual rights of a minority group under the California
3. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 233-34 (1962) (discussing the Court's
jurisprudence under the Guarantee Clause and citing many cases holding it
nonjusticiable); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should be
Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 863-70 (1994) (stating that "countless" Supreme
Court decisions have held the principle that the Guarantee Clause presents a
nonjusticiable political question, and citing and discussing many of these cases).
4. See, e.g., Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A
Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1962) (considered a primary pre-
1980 article criticizing nonjusticiability of the Guarantee Clause); Chemerinsky, supra note
3, at 864-70 (arguing that the United States Supreme Court should adjudicate claims
under the Guarantee Clause on the merits primarily because the Guarantee Clause
protects individual rights).
5. Former Oregon Supreme Court Senior Judge Hans A. Linde has pioneered this
theory of the duty of state courts to adjudicate claims brought under the Guarantee
Clause. Linde has written extensively on this subject. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, State
Courts and Republican Government, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 951 (2001); Hans A.
Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 709 (1994).
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states that the federal laws and
Constitution are "the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." Id.
7. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175 (1874) (stating that the




constitution.8 California courts were obligated to analyze Proposition
8 for its consistency with the protections of the Guarantee Clause.
Although the Guarantee Clause's structural protections serve to
reinforce substantive rights protected in the Bill of Rights, judicial
review under the Guarantee Clause is an independent inquiry from a
determination of whether an initiative like Proposition 8 is otherwise
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.9
This Note presents a three-part argument. First, the Guarantee
Clause provides critical structural protections for minority rights in
the political process. When an initiative places minority rights on the
ballot for a majority vote and bypasses the safeguards of deliberation
by a representative legislature, that process violates the Guarantee
Clause's protection of the republican form of government. This
violation is particularly egregious where the initiative removes
individual rights protected under a state constitution.
Second, state courts are bound to adjudicate Guarantee Clause
challenges and to uphold this federal constitutional protection of both
the republican form of government and the individual rights of their
citizens. Although Guarantee Clause challenges have avoided
adjudication in the federal courts because of the political question
doctrine, state courts have a constitutional responsibility to hear
Guarantee Clause challenges to state initiatives on the merits."
Third, state courts must adjudicate challenges to such initiatives
before they are placed on the ballot. The availability of post-
enactment judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause is no
8. Proposition 8 is now CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, but will be referred to in this Note
as Proposition 8.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits States
to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
Scholars have long argued that the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause,
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3, have been stretched too thin by judges in decisions
defining the scope of individual rights, and that the Privileges or Immunities Clause, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2, should be revived to protect individual rights. See, e.g.,
Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause to
Redress the Balance Among States, Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3 Tex. Rev.
L. & Pol. 1 (1998) (arguing that Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended by the
Founders to be primary source of individual rights protection and that liberals and
originalists alike should support its revival).
10. Federal courts are also constitutionally obligated to enforce the Guarantee
Clause, although, as this Note discusses, they have consistently declined to do so under the
political question doctrine. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 233 (1962) (discussing
the Court's jurisprudence under the Guarantee Clause and citing many cases holding it
nonjusticiable); Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 863-70 (listing cases finding Guarantee
Clause to be a nonjusticiable political question).
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substitute for judicial review at this stage. Pre-election judicial review
would prevent this structural constitutional harm to minorities and to
the political community at large.
Section I of this Note defines the republican form of government,
discusses its virtues, and identifies its critical distinctions from the
direct democratic form. Section II addresses the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Guarantee Clause. It traces
how the Guarantee Clause became nonjusticiable under the political
question doctrine and discuss the Guarantee Clause's connection to
rights also protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Section III
explains why judicial review of initiatives at the pre-election stage is
critical for enforcing these rights. Section IV discusses the
interpretation of the Guarantee Clause in state courts, and presents
the California and Oregon Supreme Courts' responses to challenges
to initiative lawmaking. Section V argues that the Guarantee Clause
imposes an outer limit on the use of the initiative power to change
state constitutions. After discussing two examples of initiatives that
reached this limit, Colorado's Amendment 2 and California's
Proposition 8, it proposes that these state courts had an alternative
federal basis to find these initiatives unconstitutional: initiatives
proposing to amend a state constitution to abrogate the individual
rights of minorities violate the Guarantee Clause's guarantee to a
republican form of government. Finally, Section VI explores the
relationship between the Guarantee Clause and the California
Constitution's revision/amendment distinction.
I. Defining the Republican Form of Government
Legal scholars have considerably different theories regarding
what defines the republican form from other democratic systems of
government. Some scholars argue that all state initiatives are per se
violations of republican government." Others argue that the central
meaning of republicanism is popular sovereignty, and that direct
democracy is therefore perfectly consistent with, although not
required by, a republican form of government in which most
lawmaking is done by representative decision makers.1 2 This Note
11. See, e.g., Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, "And to the Republic for
Which it Stands": Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 1057, 1059 (1996) (arguing that the Guarantee Clause establishes a "per se
prohibition against state initiatives").
12. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government. Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 Colo. L. Rev. 749, 756-59
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adopts a definition of a republican form of government under the
Guarantee Clause as one that requires, at a minimum, a deliberative
lawmaking process by elected representatives.13
Alexis de Tocqueville believed that deliberative legislative
processes were one of the greatest virtues of the American republic.
In Democracy in America, Tocqueville emphasized that a republic "is
a conciliatory government under which resolutions have time to
ripen, being discussed with deliberation and executed only when
mature.,
14
James Madison believed that a republican form of government
ensured the protection of the public good and private rights from the
dangerous passions of a "majority faction."15 The defining difference
between a democracy and a republic, he argued, is that "in a
democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person;
in a republic they assemble and administer it by their representatives
and agents." 6  Madison understood two critical features to be
required in a republican form of government: the delegation of power
to elected representatives, and deliberation by those elected
representatives before laws were enacted.'7  Madison believed that
the delegation of lawmaking authority from the citizens themselves to
a smaller number of elected representatives was a structural
mechanism that would ensure a better substantive legal outcome.
Through the deliberative and reasoned process of lawmaking, he
wrote, lawmakers could "refine and enlarge the public views.,
18
Alexander Hamilton argued that deliberative lawmaking by
elected representatives was a virtue that distinguished a republic from
a democracy because it better ensured laws would be enacted for the
(1994) (rejecting anti-direct democracy thesis as "law office history" and stating its
historical and theoretical basis is "not proven").
13. See, e.g., H.M.S. SELLERS, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY 99 (N.Y.U. Press 1998)
(including in list of American republican virtues the pursuit of the common good, popular
sovereignty, a deliberative senate, and the rule of law); Ethan J. Leib, Redeeming the
Welshed Guarantee: A Scheme for Achieving Justiciability, 24 Whittier L. Rev. 143, 149-69
(2002) (discussing theoretical and legal debates as to meaning of republicanism).
14. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 395 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Doubleday 1969) (1835).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003).
16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 60 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 44 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003) (setting
forth same definitions quoted in No. 14).
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003).
18. Id.
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common good. 9  Like Madison, Hamilton believed that the
procedural mechanism of deliberative lawmaking by elected
representatives would ensure more just laws and better public
policies. When voters' long-term interests conflict with their
immediate desires or impulses, Hamilton argued, it is the duty of
elected representatives, whom the voters have appointed to act as
guardians of those interests, to "withstand the temporary delusion, in
order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate
reflection."2 °
The United States Supreme Court's definition of the republican
form of government under the Guarantee Clause has been consistent
with these defenses of the republican form. In 1891, the Court in In
re Duncan" endorsed a definition of republicanism under the
Guarantee Clause which emphasized the delegation of lawmaking
power to elected representatives who legislate for the common good
and protect against the impulsivity of majority factions. Chief Justice
Fuller wrote for the majority:
By the Constitution, a republican form of government is
guarantied [sic] to every State in the Union, and the
distinguishing feature of that form is the right of the people to
choose their own officers for governmental administration, and
pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in
representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be
those of the people themselves; but, while the people are thus
the source of political power, their governments, National and
State, have been limited by written constitutions, and they have
themselves thereby set bounds to their own power, as against
the sudden impulses of mere majorities.
22
Because initiatives are enacted by direct majority vote, and
bypass these republican processes of formal debate and deliberation
by elected representatives, the substantive laws enacted by initiative
also suffer. State ballot initiatives do not benefit from the
Hamiltonian process of "cool and sedate reflection"' and instead risk
basing public policy on the "temporary delusion[s] ' ,24 of a majority
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 349 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003).
20. Id.





faction at the expense of both the long-term common good of the
political community and the individual rights of minority voters.
Although this critique of initiative lawmaking as self-interested
and shortsighted may apply to many laws enacted by the initiative
process, not all state initiatives amount to federal constitutional
violations. When the initiative process is used to place the individual
rights of minorities on the ballot for a popular vote, however, this
process not only results in bad public policy but also violates the
Guarantee Clause.
II. The Guarantee Clause in the United States Supreme Court
A. The Road to Nonjusticiability Under the Political Question
Doctrine
In Luther v. Borden,26 the United States Supreme Court was
asked to determine which of two rival governments was sovereign in
Rhode Island. Rhode Island had recently approved a state
constitution, but the officers under the state charter government
prohibited the holding of elections under the new constitution, and
police officers enforced this ban on elections by force. 7  This
incumbent charter government's police officers broke into the
plaintiff's house, accusing him of illegal electioneering.' The plaintiff
sued for trespass, claiming that the government the policemen
represented was unconstitutional because it was no longer in a
republican form.2' The Court dismissed the case as nonjusticiable,
stating that the Guarantee Clause allocated to Congress the authority
to decide between two rival state governments. ° The Court framed
the issue as one of both separation of powers and federalism, stating
that the Federal Constitution, "as far as it has provided for an
emergency of this kind, and authorized the general government to
25. One contemporary example of a ballot initiative that resulted in shortsighted
policymaking but did not rise to the level of a Guarantee Clause violation was California's
Proposition 13. Proposition 13 was passed by the state's voters in November 1978 and
changed the state's constitution to permanently reduce property taxes and impose limits
on the ability of local governments to levy new taxes and fees without voter approval. See
CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
26. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 35-38.
30. Id. at 42 (stating that "[u]nder this article of the Constitution it rests with
Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State").
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interfere in the domestic concerns of a State, has treated the subject
as political in its nature,"31 and has limited that federal power to
Congress.
The Court's discussion was very concerned with protecting the
balance of federalism, a jurisdictional concern limited to the federal
courts. The Luther Court's emphasis on federalism leaves open the
state courts as a venue to hear challenges under the Guarantee
Clause. Further, the facts that gave rise to the Guarantee Clause
question in Luther were historically unique and centrally concerned
political sovereignty. Thus, Luther should not stand for a general
nonjusticiability rule where a Guarantee Clause challenge arises from
a case in which individual rights are more central to the merits.
In Minor v. Happersett, the Court considered the argument that
the denial of women's right to vote was inconsistent with a republican
form of government.32 The petitioners contended that the state
constitution and laws of Missouri, by restricting the franchise to men,
were an unconstitutional denial of the republican form of government
as guaranteed under the Federal Constitution.3 Because Missouri
and other states had a tradition of restricting the franchise to men
that predated the ratification of the Federal Constitution, including
the Guarantee Clause, the Court found that in 1874, it was "too late
to contend that a government is not republican, within the meaning of
this guaranty [sic] in the Constitution, because women are not made
voters."34
Minor is significant because it reached the merits of the
petitioner's Guarantee Clause arguments despite Luther's strong
rhetoric of nonjusticiability, even if the Court ultimately relied on
history and tradition to reject those arguments. Further, the Minor
Court discussed the meaning of the Guarantee Clause's protection of
the republican form of government at length, and expressly stated
that the "guaranty [sic] necessarily implies a duty on the part of the
States themselves to provide such a government."35 The Court has
never refuted this statement, and despite its own consistent refusal to
adjudicate challenges arising under the Guarantee Clause, it
31. Id.
32. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162,165 (1874).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 176.
35. Id. at 175.
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emphasizes the Court's recognition of the critical role of state courts
in upholding the Guarantee Clause's protections.
Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon36 is
considered the Court's last word regarding the justiciability of
Guarantee Clause claims in the federal courts.37 In Pacific States, the
Court heard an appeal from the Oregon Supreme Court as to
whether a tax on the gross revenue of telephone and telegraph
companies, enacted by initiative under the Oregon constitution,
violated the Guarantee Clause. Chief Justice White considered the
question to be clear: "whether it is the duty of the courts or the
province of Congress to determine when a state has ceased to be
republican in form, and to enforce the guaranty [sic] of the
Constitution on that subject.""
The Pacific States Court interpreted Luther v. Borden to have
already established that enforcement of the Guarantee Clause was a
political question, and therefore a subject that only the "political
department" of the federal government had the power to enforce.39
Because of this preliminary justiciability determination, the Court
dismissed the case without reaching the merits of whether Oregon's
initiative process was consistent with a republican form of
government, and without discussing how its separation of powers-
based ruling affected the state courts.' Since Pacific States, the Court
has consistently held that challenges under the Guarantee Clause are
political questions, and as such are nonjusticiable in the federal
courts.4t
36. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), affg State v. Pac.
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 99 P. 427 (Or. 1909).
37. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 862 (stating that it was not until Pacific States
that "the Court truly buried the Guarantee Clause by interpreting Luther v. Borden to
hold the Guarantee Clause a grant of power only to the political branches").
38. Pac. States, 223 U.S. at 133.
39. Id. at 149.
40. Id. at 151.
41. See, e.g., Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1916) (rejecting
Guarantee Clause challenge to state worker's compensation statute by holding it
nonjusticiable political question under both Luther v. Borden and Pacific States); O'Neill
v. Learner, 239 U.S. 244 (1915) (rejecting Guarantee Clause challenge to Nebraska
delegation of power to form municipal drainage district, and stating summarily that the
plaintiff's attempt to invoke the Guarantee Clause "is obviously futile"); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 863-64 (discussing history of dismissal of claims under
Guarantee Clause after Pacific States as nonjusticiable political questions).
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B. The Guarantee Clause's Connection with Individual Rights and
Equal Protection
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the majority of the justices rejected
constitutional challenges to Louisiana's state-enforced segregation
policy on privately run passenger trains."' Justice John Harlan wrote
a forceful dissent in which he argued that Louisiana's segregation
laws were unconstitutional because they violated the guarantee of a
republican form of government in the States.43 He argued that
although slavery had been abolished, state-enforced racial
segregation remained an unconstitutional scheme because it made a
minority group of American citizens legally inferior, and so interfered
with the proper functioning of a representative form of government."4
Justice Harlan contended that:
Such a system is inconsistent with the guaranty [sic] given by the
constitution to each state of a republican form of government,
and may be stricken down by congressional action, or by the
courts in the discharge of their solemn duty to maintain the
supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of
any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
This statement is significant because of its timing, its
interpretation of the Guarantee Clause as providing protection for
individual rights, and its call for both Congress and state courts to
enforce the Guarantee Clause's guarantee to the republican form of
government. Plessy was decided in 1896, after Luther v. Borden
(1849) but before Pacific States (1912). This timeline undermines the
reasoning of Pacific States insofar as its holding relied on interpreting
Luther to have conclusively settled the issue that challenges under the
Guarantee Clause were nonjusticiable political questions. Justice
Harlan's Plessy dissent indicates that in the last decade of the
Nineteenth Century, constitutional challenges to state laws brought
under the Guarantee Clause were understood by at least one member
of the Court to be justiciable.
Further, Justice Harlan's dissent implied that the Guarantee
Clause should be understood to protect both the individual rights of
minorities and the integrity of republican political processes. Justice
42. Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 U.S. 537, 549-52 (1896).
43. Id. at 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 564.
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Harlan argued that the individual members of a segregated minority
are not the only victims of state-enforced segregation. The healthy
functioning of a representative, republican government depends on
the equal political participation of all citizens. By denying the
equality of minority citizens under state law, state-enforced
segregation also imposes a structural harm on the American republic.
Finally, Justice Harlan stated that when a state law like
Louisiana's violates the federal constitutional guarantee, the
Guarantee Clause must be enforced either by "congressional action
46
or by the courts "in their discharge of their solemn duty to maintain
the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of
any state to the contrary notwithstanding., 47 Justice Harlan clearly
was referring to the obligation of the state courts under the
Supremacy Clause,48 which binds the "j]udges in every State, 49 to
uphold the Federal Constitution where it conflicts with their own
state law and state constitution. Because of the Court's position that
the Guarantee Clause is nonjusticiable, the first enforcement option
of "congressional action"5° has become the only viable option at the
federal level. In contrast, at the state level the courts remain
obligated to enforce the protections of the Guarantee Clause against
its infringement by their own state's laws or constitution.
Like Justice Harlan's Plessy dissent, the majority opinion in
Baker v. Carr5 recognized the similar structural protections for
individual rights that resonate in both the Equal Protection Clause
2
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause. In Baker,
the Court considered challenges to Tennessee's state apportionment
statute based on both the Equal Protection and Guarantee Clauses.
Rejecting Tennessee's argument that a challenge to a state
apportionment scheme always presents a nonjusticiable political
question, the Baker Court instead listed the considerations a court
should consider in determining whether such a challenge falls under
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. U.S. CONST. art. VI, §1, cl. 2.
49. Id.
50. Plessy, 16 U.S. at 564 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
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the political question doctrine. 3 Interestingly, the Court held that a
challenge to a state apportionment statute does not present a
nonjusticiable political question so long as it is brought under the
Equal Protection Clause and not solely under the Guarantee Clause. 4
The Court acknowledged, however, that the case "involve[d] the
allocation of political power within a State," which was an issue
traditionally challenged under the Guarantee Clause as well as the
Bill of Rights," and went to great lengths to distinguish the case from
the long line of precedent in which analogous cases had been deemed
nonjusticiable because they were brought under the Guarantee
Clause.56
In his opinion for the Baker majority, Justice Brennan clarified
that "in the Guaranty [sic] Clause cases and in other 'political
question' cases, it is the relationship between the judiciary and the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government... which gives rise
to the 'political question.' 57 Like Justice Harlan's Plessy dissent," the
Baker majority recognized the connection between the individual
constitutional rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause and
those structural rights theoretically protected but deemed
nonjusticiable political questions 9 under the Guarantee Clause.
State courts should interpret United States Supreme Court cases
like Plessy and Baker to stand for the connection between the
substantive individual rights protected by the Equal Protection
Clause, and the equally important structural rights to a republican
form of government protected by the Guarantee Clause. The
Guarantee Clause provides independent, judicially enforceable
structural protections for individual rights which supplement the
53. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209-27 (discussing criteria for determining whether case falls
under political question doctrine generally and citing Guarantee Clause cases the Court
has held to be political questions).
54. Id. at 228.
55. See, e.g., Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Or., 223 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1912)
(considering petitioner's challenges to a state initiative under both the Equal Protection
Clause and Guarantee Clause).
56. Baker, 369 U.S. at 227 (discussing and attempting to distinguish Pacific States, in
which an initiative was challenged substantively under the Equal Protection Clause, and
procedurally under the Guarantee Clause).
57. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.
58. Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 U.S. 537, 563 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210. The Court's discussion of the political question doctrine
discusses separation of powers issues extensively, concluding that the "nonjusticiability of
a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers." Id.
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substantive protections of the Bill of Rights. State courts should not
interpret federal political question jurisprudence to relieve them of
their own obligation to adjudicate challenges brought under the
Guarantee Clause.
HI. The Necessity of Pre-Election Judicial Review Under the
Guarantee Clause
Pre-election judicial review of initiatives under the Guarantee
Clause must be available because of the nature of the constitutional
injury majority proponents of initiatives inflict on minority voters,
and because of the nature of judicial review appropriate to the
Guarantee Clause's structural protections.
First, initiatives involving the individual rights of minorities must
be reviewable under the Guarantee Clause before they are placed on
an election ballot because this placement alone inflicts a
constitutionally cognizable injury. A challenge to an initiative under
the Guarantee Clause should be reviewed regardless of whether, if
enacted, the minorities oppressed by the law would have a remedy
under Bill of Rights provisions such as the Equal Protection Clause.
The Guarantee Clause promises citizens a structural political process
right to a government where elected representatives enact laws after a
deliberative lawmaking process. Although this deliberative process
should lead to better laws, as Madison and Hamilton imagined,
judicial review of whether a certain use of the initiative power is
consistent with the republican form of government is distinct from the
review of the enacted law itself.
Second, pre-election judicial review under the Guarantee Clause
must be available because post-enactment review is inappropriate to
the issues presented in such a challenge. Judicial review of
substantive legal outcomes under the Bill of Rights is inappropriate to
the review of structural political process rights because it involves
balancing the relative strengths of governmental interests and
individual rights. 6° Laws enacted by a deliberative process of elected
representatives as well as laws enacted by initiative may infringe on
individual rights. Judicial review for Bill of Rights violations must
always be made available to individuals who are injured by a state
law, regardless of the process by which that law is enacted. But this
60. See Rogers & Faigman, supra note 11, at 1070-71 (arguing that heightened
scrutiny of laws enacted by initiative process is inappropriate because of balancing, rather
than categorical, inquiry).
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substantive judicial review of outcomes under the Bill of Rights
cannot substitute for judicial review under the Guarantee Clause of
whether the process by which a law is enacted violates the
Constitution because it is inconsistent with the republican form.
It is no fatal impediment to the adjudication of Guarantee Clause
challenges that the legal standards of "republicanism" are ambiguous,
or that the constitutionality of an initiative would be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Despite the difficulty of defining the republican
form of government, and despite the reality that each State's initiative
process may be unique, the question of whether a particular process is
consistent with the republican form is a categorical question6
squarely within the judicial expertise and duty of state courts charged
to uphold the protections of the Federal Constitution.
IV. The Guarantee Clause in the State Supreme Courts
A. The Supreme Court of Oregon: Kadderly v. City of Portland
In Kadderly v. City of Portland, the Supreme Court of Oregon
adjudicated a Guarantee Clause challenge to the 1902 Initiative and
Referendum Amendment to the Oregon Constitution (the "1902
Amendment").6 2 The 1902 Amendment was passed by the state
legislature and ratified by the electorate, and purported to create a
reserved initiative and referendum power in the Oregon voters.63
The Kadderly court first considered the jurisdictional question of
whether, as a state court, it had the power to decide if the 1902
Amendment was consistent with a republican form of government
under the Guarantee Clause. ' To this question the court gave an
emphatic "yes," stating that it was "clear that [the 1902
Amendment's] validity is a judicial, and not a political, question.,
6
1
Distinguishing the case before it from the facts held to present a
nonjusticiable political question in Luther v. Borden,66 the court
reasoned that the case before it involved an issue of constitutional
interpretation clearly within the expertise of the judicial branch, while
Luther had presented a question of deciding between a government
61. Id. at 1071.
62. Kadderly v. City of Portland, 74 P. 710, 714-15 (Or. 1903).
63. Id. at 712.
64. Id. at 714-15.
65. Id. at 715.
66. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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claiming sovereignty under a constitution and another claiming
sovereignty under a charter, which presented a question more
appropriate for the political branch.6
Turning to the merits, the court discussed the necessary features
of the republican form of government under the Guarantee Clause.
The court found that the initiative and referendum powers, unlike
aristocratic or monarchial forms, seemed consistent with
republicanism because they appeared merely to shift additional
powers to the people over their legislature, but retained an element of
popular sovereignty.6 Several aspects of the Kadderly court's
reasoning and conclusion on this issue are significant.
First, the court reached the merits of the case, although it was
brought expressly as a challenge under the Guarantee Clause, and
despite the fact that the case was decided well after Luther v. Borden,
which had seemingly rejected such challenges as nonjusticiable in the
federal courts. The Supreme Court of Oregon did not hesitate to find
that the case presented a judicial question that it was obligated to
adjudicate on the merits.
Second, the court's conclusion that the initiative clause of the
1902 Amendment did not violate the Guarantee Clause relied on its
finding that "laws proposed and enacted by the people under the
initiative clause of the amendment are subject to the same
constitutional limitations as other statutes, and may be amended or
repealed by the Legislature at will. ' 69  This part of the court's
reasoning is suspect because the 1902 Amendment clearly permitted
the initiative power to be used for constitutional amendments, and
not only statutory laws.7' Changes to the state constitution, enacted
by initiative, would of course not be "subject to the same
constitutional limitations as other statutes"'" since they would in fact
be changing the constitution itself. Further, the Oregon Court's
holding relied on the additional safeguard that a measure passed by
67. Kadderly, 74 P. at 716.
68. Id. at 720.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 712. The text of the 1902 Initiative and Referendum Amendment read, in
pertinent part, "the people reserve to themselves power to propose laws and amendments
to the Constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the
legislative assembly." Id.
71. Id. at 720.
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initiative could still, under the Oregon Constitution, be "amended or
repealed by the Legislature at will."72
Third, the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment was rendered
completely in the abstract. The Kadderly court was called on to
determine whether, as a matter of principle, the powers of initiative
or referenda could be reconciled with the idea of a republican form of
government. The 1902 Amendment created an initiative power, but
did not present a particular use of that initiative power by which the
Court could consider the application of its ruling when used to create
a law or to amend the constitution. For that reason, the most the
Kadderly opinion stands for is that the initiative (and referenda)
power, when used to make statutory law rather than amend the state
constitution, is not inimical per se to a republican form of
government. Kadderly does not, however, inform state courts about
the substantive contours of the initiative power or about which laws
the initiative power may be used to enact if this power is to remain
consistent with the republican form of government.
Despite the limits of the Kadderly decision, when carefully
considered, Oregon73 and other state courts, including California,
have erroneously cited this case to stand for a final determination that
the use of the initiative and referenda power to make state laws and,
more importantly, to amend state constitutions, is consistent with a
republican form of government.
B. The Supreme Court of California: In re Pfahler
In re Pfahler74 presented the Supreme Court of California with a
challenge to the validity of the initiative power under the charter of
the City of Los Angeles.75 The challenge arose from the petitioner's
arrest and incarceration for violating a municipal ordinance
prohibiting the slaughtering of animals within certain geographical
limits. 76 The petitioner conceded that if the ordinance had been
72. Id. This safeguard does not exist in California. On the contrary, a law or
constitutional amendment passed by the initiative in California not only bypasses the
deliberative lawmaking process of the state legislature to become law, but can only be
repealed or modified by another initiative. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
73. See, e.g., State v. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 99 P. 427 (Or. 1909) (rejecting
challenge to tax enacted by initiative and stating that issue of whether an initiative or
referendum violated the Guarantee Clause had been conclusively resolved in Kadderly),
affd Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
74. In re Pfahler, 88 P. 270 (Cal. 1906).
75. Id. at 271.
76. Id.
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enacted by the city council through the ordinary legislative process-
by vote of the city council and approval of the mayor-it would be a
valid use of the local police power under the California Constitution.
Because the ordinance had been enacted through the initiative
process, the petitioner claimed it had never actually been legally
enacted and therefore he should be released.77 The Los Angeles
charter had been amended in 1903 to allow for local ordinances to be
proposed and enacted by initiative, as well as providing for a
referenda process, although only the initiative process was challenged
in the case."
Unlike in Kadderly, where the Supreme Court of Oregon
presumed that the elected legislature retained the power to amend or
repeal a law enacted by initiative, the Supreme Court of California
acknowledged that both the initiative and referenda powers granted
by the Los Angeles charter meant that "it is the vote of the electors at
the ballot box that finally determines whether or not a proposed
measure shall be a law at all."79 The court recognized the significance
of the initiative power in particular, noting that the electors
effectively stand in the shoes of the elected city council members and
have the power to enact local legislation "as they may deem
expedient, where the council declines to enact the same."8
The Supreme Court of California, then, was presented squarely
with a Guarantee Clause question: Whether an initiative power
purporting to grant the voters of a chartered municipality the
authority to enact local laws that the local legislature refuses to
approve is a "forbidden departure from the republican form of
government guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.""
The court first assumed that, despite language to the contrary in
Luther v. Borden and other federal cases, the petitioner's question
was judicially cognizable because it was brought in state court. 
2
Next, the court turned to the merits, considering it well within its
capabilities to determine whether this use of the initiative process was
77. Id.
78. Id. at 271-272.
79. Id. at 272. Contrast this language with Kadderly v. City of Portland, 74 P. 710, 720
(Or. 1903) (presuming that "laws proposed and enacted by the people under the initiative
clause of the amendment are subject to the same constitutional limitations as other
statutes, and may be amended or repealed by the Legislature at will").
80. In re Pfahler, 88 P. at 272.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 273.
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such a "forbidden departure" from the republican form of
government so as to violate the Guarantee Clause.' The court held
that it was not such a departure, but limited its holding to the local
context, holding only that the Guarantee Clause "does not prohibit
the direct exercise of legislative power by the people of a subdivision
of a state in strictly local affairs."" Following the historical reasoning
used by the United States Supreme Court in Minor v. Happersett,5
the court reasoned that all local government forms which existed at or
before ratification were republican. The court concluded that
exercises of direct legislation by a municipal electorate were
analogous to town meetings in colonial New England, and therefore
this use of the initiative power did not violate the Guarantee Clause."
Justice McFarland wrote a strong dissenting opinion lamenting
the majority's readiness to "abandon prominent features of our
American system of government," namely, the republican lawmaking
process.87 Channeling Madison and Hamilton, Justice McFarland
emphasized the republican virtues of deliberative lawmaking by an
elected representative body in which laws may be fully considered,
and policies are enacted only after their long-term effects are
carefully reflected upon and debated.8 In contrast, the initiative
process was vulnerable to abuse by "demagogues, pseudo-reformers,
or promoters of discontent" 89 who are able to pass a measure by
fooling the voters or appealing to their passions and prejudices and
rushing the measure into law before there is time for a "sober second
thought."9  Justice McFarland argued that initiative lawmaking
"admits the very evils which the representative form of government
was intended to guard against." 9'
The In re Pfahler court makes two distinctions in its reasoning
that limit the precedential effect of the case. First, the court
distinguishes between the uses of the initiative process at the
municipal level versus at the state level, and clearly limits its holding
83. Id. at 271.
84. Id. at 273.
85. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 175-76 (1874). See supra Section III.A.
86. In re Pfahler, 88 P. at 273 (reasoning that "if the people may legislate directly at
town meetings, they may do so by vote at the polls").
87. Id. at 280 (McFarland, J., dissenting).






on the constitutionality of the initiative power to the local context.
Second, the court makes an implicit distinction between the use of the
initiative process to enact laws and its use to amend a state
constitution.
This second distinction is particularly significant. The majority
opinion indicated acceptance of Kadderly's holding insofar as it
applied to initiative lawmaking to pass statutes at the state level.' In
limiting its holding to the local level, the In re Pfahler court also
stated that this narrow holding should not be understood as a
statement that "the people of a state may not reserve the supervisory
control as to general state legislation afforded by the initiative and
referendum, without violating the federal constitution [sic]." 93 The
California Supreme Court in In re Pfahler cited Kadderly to stand for
the proposition that states may permit the use of the initiative power
to enact general state legislation without violating the Guarantee
Clause, but omitted the fact that the 1902 Initiative and Referendum
Amendment challenged in Kadderly had also permitted the use of
these processes to amend the Oregon Constitution. Further, the
Kadderly court itself had also declined to analyze the validity of
Oregon's constitutional amendment power under the Guarantee
Clause.94
C. The Issues Left Unresolved by Kadderly and In re Pfahler
In Kadderly and In re Pfahler, the Oregon and California
Supreme Courts considered challenges to initiative lawmaking under
the Guarantee Clause, and in each case upheld the initiative power as
consistent with a republican form of government. Properly
understood, however, these holdings are narrow and leave room for
further Guarantee Clause challenges to initiatives in state courts.
Two important issues remain unresolved. First, whether the initiative
power may be used to alter a state constitution when the safeguards
emphasized in Kadderly and cited in In re Pfahler are not present.
Second, whether a particular initiative that places the individual rights
92. Id. at 273.
93. Id.
94. Kadderly v. City of Portland, 74 P. 710, 714-15 (Or. 1903). The text of the 1902
Initiative and Referendum Amendment read, in pertinent part, "the people reserve to
themselves power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and to enact or
reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislative assembly." Id. at 712 (emphasis
added).
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of minorities on the ballot may violate the Guarantee Clause despite
the facial constitutionality of the initiative power.
V. The Necessary Limits Imposed By the Guarantee Clause on
State Initiatives: Examples from Colorado and California
Colorado's Amendment 2, ultimately challenged before the
United States Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans,95 and California's
Proposition 8, recently challenged before the California Supreme
Court in Strauss v. Horton,96 present issues unresolved by the early
Twentieth Century state court decisions under the Guarantee Clause.
Both initiative measures present precisely the use of the
initiative power that the Guarantee Clause is designed to protect
against: an amendment to a state constitution that singles out the
individual rights of a minority group. In both Colorado and
California, these initiatives were placed on the ballot and passed by a
bare majority of the state electorate. 97 After its enactment and post-
enactment challenge, Colorado's Amendment 2 was ultimately
invalidated by the United States Supreme Court under the Equal
Protection Clause.98 On May 26, 2009, the California Supreme Court
upheld Proposition 8 against three post-enactment challenges"
brought primarily under the California Constitution.' This Note
argues that the availability of post-enactment judicial review of these
initiative amendments did not relieve either the California or
95. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
96. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (consolidated with City & County of San Francisco v.
Horton, No. S168078 and Tyler v. State of California, No. S168066, which also involved
challenges to the constitutionality of Proposition 8 under the California Constitution).
97. California's Proposition 8 passed with fifty-two percent of the vote. See Jesse
McKinley, Top Court in California Will Review Proposition 8, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008,
at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/us/20marriage.html?scp=6&sq=
California %20Proposition%208&st=cse.
98. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635-36.
99. See cases cited supra note 96.
100. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). Only Justice Carlos R. Moreno
dissented, writing that he would have held that Proposition 8 "is not a lawful amendment
of the California Constitution." Id. at 140. The Strauss opinion and additional filings in
the Proposition 8 litigation are posted on the website of the California Supreme Court, at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/highprofile/prop8.htm (last visited Aug. 17,
2009). On May 22, 2009, a federal post-enactment challenge to Proposition 8 was filed in
United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Brought under Title
42, Section 1983 of the United States Code, the complaint alleges that Proposition 8
violates the due process and equal protection rights of gays and lesbians and seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief against its enforcement. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
2009 WL 1490740 (N. D. Cal. May 22, 2009).
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Colorado state courts from their constitutional obligation to perform
pre-election review under the Guarantee Clause.'O
A. Amendment 2 in Colorado
Amendment 2 was an amendment to the Colorado Constitution
enacted in 1992 by that state's initiative process.' °2 The campaign for
Amendment 2, and its ultimate adoption by Colorado voters, came in
response to ordinances passed in multiple Colorado municipalities"3
banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.' °4 The text
of Amendment 2 read:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or
Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through
any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies,
political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise
be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have
or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution
shall be in all respects self-executing0
Romer v. Evans'06 involved an Equal Protection Clause challenge
to the constitutionality of Amendment 2. The United States Supreme
Court, hearing the case on appeal from the Supreme Court of
Colorado's ruling that Amendment 2 was unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds, found that it effected a "sweeping and
comprehensive" change in the legal status of gay, lesbian, and
bisexual persons under Colorado law.'0 7  If upheld, the Court
101. The federal courts, of course, are also constitutionally obligated to uphold the
Guarantee Clause and the important rights it was designed to protect. The plaintiffs'
complaint in Perry makes equal protection and due process arguments, but does not
include the Guarantee Clause. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2009 WL 1490740 (N. D. Cal.
May 22, 2009).
102. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
103. For example, the cities of Boulder and Aspen, and the City and County of Denver
passed anti-discrimination ordinances in many contexts, including housing, employment,
education, public accommodations, and health and welfare services for their local
populations. See id. at 623.
104. Id. at 623-24.
105. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b.
106. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
107. Id. at 627.
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recognized, Amendment 2 would have had the effect of placing gay,
lesbian, and bisexual persons "in a solitary class with respect to
transactions and relations in both the private and governmental
spheres... [by] withdraw[ing] from homosexuals, but no others,
specific legal protections.., and forbid[ing] reinstatement of these
laws and policies."' 8
The harm done by Amendment 2, the Court reasoned, was
particularly egregious because of the initiative process by which it
amended the Colorado Constitution. In order to reverse the harm
done by Amendment 2, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals and their
supporters could not simply appeal to their elected state
representatives in the Colorado legislature, but would have had to
convince a majority of Colorado voters to amend the state
constitution again to provide for specific protections for them as a
class.""
The Court recited the rational basis standard of review and
analyzed the constitutionality of Amendment 2 under the Equal
Protection Clause."' The Court's reasoning, however, focused on the
rights of minority groups to effectively use the lawmaking process
without first having to overcome additional barriers-an argument
made more soundly under the Guarantee Clause than the Equal
Protection Clause."' The Court stated that the right to equal
protection was denied by an initiative like Amendment 2, which made
it more difficult for one class of citizens apart from others to "seek aid
108. Id.
109. Id. at 631.
110. Id. at 635-36.
111. Id. at 633. Scholars have spilled a lot of ink attempting to make sense of Romer as
an Equal Protection Clause case. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment
2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203, 222 (1996). Generally, commentators have
noted the Romer Court's lack of a sound Equal Protection Clause basis for striking down
Amendment 2 while declining to hold that gays and lesbians were a constitutionally
protected class, and have attempted to present alternative justifications for the outcome.
See, e.g., Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV.
843, 923 (1999) (noting this "paradox" and presenting an alternative "interpretation based
on jurisdictional design" and arguing that Romer could illustrate the rule that a state may
not attempt to selectively disempower localities, in which homosexuals or any other
statewide minority may enjoy a majority of political support, through an initiative passed
at the state level"); David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local
Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 587-590 (1999) (noting that the Romer opinion
is "notably obscure," suggesting Romer instead stands at least in part for the "deep
connection between localism and positive constitutional enforcement" against private
parties, and arguing that the municipalities were perhaps the proper plaintiffs in the case).
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from the government,' ' 2 and which had the statewide effect of
making that minority group "a stranger to its laws.' 13 The Court
found that Amendment 2, by denying gay, lesbian, and bisexual
citizens the ability to protect their interests through meaningful access
to the political process at both the state and municipal levels, violated
the Equal Protection Clause."4 The tone of Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Court indicates discomfort with the fact that, through
the use of direct democracy, a majority of Colorado voters had
amended their state constitution by an initiative "born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected."" 5 At a minimum, the Court
reasoned, the United States Constitution required the Court to strike
down a law enacted out of "a 'bare... desire to harm a politically
unpopular group.""'"
The United States Supreme Court never should have needed to
hear the post-enactment challenge to Amendment 2 under the Equal
Protection Clause. The reasons that led the Court to find that
Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause apply more
forcefully to why the Colorado Supreme Court, conducting pre-
election review under the Guarantee Clause, should have found that
the measure could not be printed on a ballot in the first place."'
Amendment 2 singled out a minority group and asked the majority of
voters in the state to vote on the rights of that minority group alone.
The Amendment purported to change the state constitution so that if
enacted, it could only be reversed by a subsequent majority vote. It
bypassed the deliberative lawmaking process of the elected
representatives in the state legislature which, in a republican form of
government, protect against laws being enacted as a result of
majoritarian passions and prejudices against a "politically unpopular
group.""18 For these reasons, Amendment 2 was a use of the initiative
process inconsistent with a republican form of government, and the
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 635-36.
115. Id. at 634.
116. Id. (quoting Dep't. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
117. See Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not 'Republican Government':
The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 71 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993) (arguing that anti-
homosexual constitutional amendment proposed by initiative as Measure 9 in Oregon in
1992 should be struck down under the Guarantee Clause).
118. Id.
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Colorado courts had an obligation to strike it down on that basis
alone, regardless of whether it was ultimately enacted.
B. Proposition 8 in California
Like Colorado's Amendment 2, Proposition 8 was a state
constitutional amendment enacted by initiative that abrogated the
previously protected individual rights of a minority group. Like
Colorado's, California's courts were constitutionally obligated to
review Proposition 8 under the Guarantee Clause before it was
placed on the ballot."1 9 Because it failed to uphold this constitutional
obligation to grant pre-election judicial review under the Guarantee
Clause, the California Supreme Court was presented with a state
constitutional challenge' 21 to a measure enacted by a bare majority of
California voters after a heated and contentious statewide election.
On May 15, 2008, in In re Marriage Cases,12t the California
Supreme Court ruled that California Family Code provisions defining
marriage as between a man and a woman violated the rights of gay
and lesbian couples to equal protection under the California
Constitution.22 On June 2, 2008, California's Secretary of State
declared that Proposition 8 could be placed on the ballot, and on
November 4, 2008, after a contentious statewide campaign in which a
combined total of eighty-five million dollars was spent, Proposition 8
119. Pre-election judicial review of voter initiatives for compliance with the single
subject rule is generally not available in California absent a "clear showing of invalidity,"
and the California Supreme Court has stated in dicta in at least one case that pre-election
review of compliance with the "nonrevision" requirement is also precluded. Brosnahan v.
Eu, 641 P.2d 200, 201 (Cal. 1982) (declining on pre-election review to reach issue of
whether proposed initiative complied with single subject requirement). However, the
Court has been willing to provide pre-election review for compliance with the nonrevision
requirement in at least one case. See McFadden v. Jordan 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948)
(reviewing proposed voter initiative for compliance with nonrevision requirement), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949). See generally, Douglas C. Michael, Comment: Preelection
Judicial Review: Taking the Initiative in Voter Protection, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1216 (1983)
(arguing that pre-election judicial review for compliance with substantive single subject
and nonrevision requirements should be available in California where there is substantial
doubt regarding a proposed initiative's constitutionality). This Note contends that pre-
election review of voter initiatives for compliance with the Guarantee Clause should be
available.
120. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). See also cases cited supra note 96.
121. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008).
122. Id.
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was put before the voters at the general election. 12 3 Proposition 8
proposed that a single line be added to Article I of the California
Constitution: "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or
recognized in California."'24  Proposition 8 passed with fifty-two
percent of the vote.12
On November 13, 2008, the City and County of San Francisco
and other petitioners filed a petition for a writ of mandate asking the
California Supreme Court to compel several named state officers to
uphold the court's prior ruling on the constitutionality of same-sex
marriage in California,' 26 and to prevent these officers from giving
legal effect to Proposition 8.1'7  The petitioners argued that
Proposition 8 exceeded the voter's initiative power of constitutional
amendment because it denied a minority group a right that was
granted to them under the state constitution, as that constitution was
recently interpreted by the California Supreme Court.28  This
fundamental change to individual rights, argued the petitioners, may
only be enacted by a constitutional revision, and may not be
accomplished by a majority of the voters by amendment.
129
VI. The Guarantee Clause and the California Constitution's
Revision/Amendment Distinction"3
The Proposition 8 petitioners' arguments were raised pursuant to
the revision/amendment distinction under the California
123. Bob Egelko, State High Court to Hear Prop. 8 Case March 5, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Feb. 4, 2009, at B-5, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/02/03/
BAMB15MMOH.DTL.
124. Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate and Memorandum of Points and
Authorities at 3, City & County of San Francisco v. Horton, No. S168078 (Cal. Nov. 13,
2008) [hereinafter Amended Petition].
125. Jesse McKinley, Top Court in California Will Review Proposition 8, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 2008, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/us/20marriage.
html?scp=6&sq=California%20Proposition%208&st=cse (stating that measure passed
with fifty-two percent of the vote and discussing California Supreme Court's decision to
hear challenges to its constitutionality).
126. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 453.
127. Amended Petition, supra note 124. See also Bob Egelko, supra note 123.
128. Amended Petition, supra note 124, at 10.
129. Amended Petition, supra note 124, at 9. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§
1-4.
130. This Note does not purport to provide a complete analysis of California's
revision/amendment, but only to briefly illustrate the thematic connection between the
rights protected by this state constitutional theory and those protected by the Guarantee
Clause.
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Constitution, but the principles behind this distinction are equally
relevant to a challenge brought under the Guarantee Clause.
Although the California Supreme Court ultimately rejected the
petitioners' arguments for a structural interpretation of the
revision/amendment distinction and upheld Proposition 8, the
Guarantee Clause presented the court with an alternative basis in the
Federal Constitution for finding Proposition 8 unconstitutional before
it was placed on the ballot.
In California, a revision requires a two-step process: (1) a
constitutional convention, or a two-thirds vote by both houses of the
legislature; and (2) ratification of the changes by a majority vote of
the electorate."' An amendment, on the other hand, effects a less
fundamental change to the constitution, and may be accomplished by
a simple majority vote of the electorate through the initiative
112process.
The California Constitution's distinction between constitutional
changes that may be accomplished by amendment and changes that
may only be accomplished by revision was explained by the California
Supreme Court in 1894:
The very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a
permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained
therein for its revision indicate the will of the people the
underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like
permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition
or change within the lines of the original instrument as will
effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for
which it was framed.
33
Constitutional changes that would fundamentally alter
"permanent and abiding" constitutional principles or fundamental
individual rights, such as the interpretation of what equal protection
requires, are revisions. Significantly, a revision requires additional
procedures, including the republican structural safeguards of
deliberative lawmaking in the state legislature, and even the
131. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-4.
132. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
133. Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424, 424,(Cal. 1894) (discussing the difference between
revision and amendment and finding that changing the seat of state government could not
be accomplished by amendment).
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prolonged debates incident to a constitutional convention. These
additional structural protections demonstrate the California
Constitution's recognition of the connection between the process by
which laws are enacted and their substance. The Proposition 8
petitioners recognized, as has the United States Supreme Court, that
the structural protections of the process by which laws are enacted
are most significant when the individual rights of minorities are at
stake.TM
The initiative process may be fully consistent with a republican
form of government where it is used to pass an amendment which
affects all citizens in the state equally. An initiative proposing to
amend the state constitution to provide a legal right to physician-
assisted suicide, for example, would be consistent with the Guarantee
Clause because all state citizens would have to live with the
consequences of the policy they chose to enact, and because the
majoritarian process could be used to reverse the amendment in the
same way that it was enacted. Likewise, under the California
Constitution's revision/amendment distinction, such an initiative
should constitute "an addition or change within the lines of the
original instrument," '135 should be classified as an amendment, and
could be enacted by a majority vote through the initiative process.
On the other hand, an initiative that amends a state constitution
to uniquely effect the individual rights of a politically unpopular
minority group is inconsistent with a republican form of government.
Proposition 8, for example, proposed to amend the California
Constitution to deny gay and lesbian couples alone the right to marry
while preserving this right for all other couples. In this situation, the
use of the initiative process is inconsistent with the structural
protections inherent in a republican form of government because it
bypasses the deliberative lawmaking process and the structural
protections that process provides for the individual rights of
minorities. Here, the minority group that is uniquely harmed by the
initiative also lacks the ability to use the majoritarian process to
reverse the initiative measure. As the petitioners argued under the
revision/amendment distinction, this type of initiative should be
classified as a revision, because it changes the "underlying
principles"'36 of the constitution's protections of individual rights, and
134. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 U.S. 537, 563 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
135. Livermore, 36 P. at 424.
136. Id.
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may not be enacted by a bare majority of the electorate through the
initiative process.
In the Federal Constitution, the connection between minority
individual rights and republican political processes is precisely what
the Guarantee Clause is designed to protect. In their post-enactment
challenge to Proposition 8, the petitioners contested that the
revision/amendment distinction was also intended to protect that
important connection. The California courts not only failed to
uphold their obligation to review Proposition 8 under the Guarantee
Clause before it was placed on the November 2008 general election
ballot, but also failed to adopt a structural interpretation of the
revision/amendment distinction that would have resulted in declaring
Proposition 8 invalid because it was a revision to the California
Constitution unconstitutionally enacted by the initiative process.
Conclusion
The Guarantee Clause provides critical structural protections for
the individual rights of minority voters by ensuring the process of
deliberative decision-making by a representative legislature necessary
to the republican form of government. Under both the Guarantee
Clause itself and the Supremacy Clause, state courts are
constitutionally required to adjudicate challenges brought to state
ballot initiatives like Colorado's Amendment 2 and California's
Proposition 8 that violate this structural protection. Finally, because
the constitutional injury to minority voters is inflicted by the
placement of their rights on the ballot for a majority plebiscite, and
because the balancing test inherent in judicial review for Bill of
Rights violations is inappropriate for the Guarantee Clause's
structural protections, pre-election judicial review under the
Guarantee Clause must be available in the state courts.
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